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How exceptional are Islamists? Comparing support for
Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces
IMAD SALAMEY and GARY COPELAND
Islamic Exceptionalism?
Islamist movements have advanced in various contemporary forms for several
decades, but there is little scholarly consensus in explaining the phenomenal rise
of these movements. At least four principal competing scholarly schools of
thought provide theoretical interpretations: post-nationalism (globalism and
weakened nation-states), comparative institutionalism, neo-Marxism (or class-
based explanations) and Islamic exceptionalism in multiple forms.1 Post-
nationalist views assert that spreading globalization and the weakening of the
nation-state in recent decades have undermined nationalism.2 The combination
of these factors provides the impetus for communal groups, such as Islamists, to
fall back on primordial political identifications (ethnic, religious, sectarian, racial,
tribal, etc.) and, at the same time, to transcend a country’s borders.3 The
comparative institutionalist argument grounds the growth of Islamist move-
ments in contemporary conditions (often tied to globalization) that place
unaccommodating political institutions in the path of ethnic and religious
aspirations.4 In contrast, class analysis uses social and economic concepts
to explain Islamic populism in terms of class mobilization and social conflict.5
ISSN 1944-8953 print/ISSN 1944-8961 online/11/020157-19 q 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2011.578859
1 Masoud Kazemzadeh, ‘Teaching the politics of Islamic fundamentalism’, Political Science and
Politics, 31, 1998, pp. 52–59. Kazemzadeh provides the justification for the choice of these four theories
which we adapt for this analysis.
2 Barbara R. Barber, ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’, The Atlantic Monthly, 269, 1992, pp. 53–65.
3 Ronald Axtmann, ‘The state of the state: the model of the modern state and its contemporary
transformation’, International Political Science Review, 25(3), 2004, pp. 259–279. Mustapha K. Pasha,
‘Predatory globalization and democracy in the Islamic world’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 581, 2002, pp. 121–132.
4 Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, Fundamentalism and Society, Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family,
and Education (The Fundamentalism Project), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993. See Martin
Marty and Scott Appleby’s ‘Fundamentalism Project’ an edited series from the University of Chicago
Press, Vols 2–4, 1993–2004.Michele Angrist and P.Marsha,Authoritarianism in theMiddle East: Regimes
and Resistance, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2005.
5 Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran: The Migrant Poor, Urban Marginality and Politics,
New York University Press, New York, 1980. Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution,
Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1989. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essay on the Islamic
Republic, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People, and the State:
Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East, I. B. Tauris, London, 1993. Fred Halliday, Islam and the
Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, I. B. Tauris, London, 1996. Adam Webb,
‘The calm before the storm? Revolutionary pressures and global governance’, International Political
Science Review, 27(1), 2006, pp. 73–92. Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson, ‘Hezbollah: a proletarian
party with an Islamic manifesto—a sociopolitical analysis of Islamist populism in Lebanon and the
Middle East’, Small War and Insurgencies, 18, 2007, pp. 416–438.
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Post-nationalism makes an identity argument; comparative institutionalism is
grounded in the failures of (state) institutions; and neo-Marxism is, of course,
grounded in economic and class-based discourse.
These three theories make claims that are not unique to Islamists; Islamic
exceptionalism, however, attributes to Islamist populism a unique and inherited
faith or cultural system. Islamic ‘revivalism’ must therefore be examined as a
phenomenon on its own.6 The faith, itself carries values that are inimical to
Western thought and democracies and must be understood as an exceptional
system.7 Kazemzadeh argues there are three distinct schools within this
paradigm. The first school, cultural relativism, claims that Islam is different from
the rest of the world but that current movements simply reflect a normal period
of historical cycles resulting in the contemporary politicization of Islam. The
second view borrows from the main tenants of the Islamic exceptionalism
argument. It sees repression as inherent in the worldview of the Islamic faith and
claims that radical Islamists have simply politicized those cultural views. The
final school of thought, Occidentalism, positions itself as a rejection against
Western political and cultural impositions and finds in Islam a superior tradition
to Western and other forms of thoughts and governance.8 The common
denominator, of course, is that all three schools see Islam as a worldview and a
way of life that is exceptional from the West and the rest of the world. The
common conclusion drawn by exceptionalists, therefore, is that Islamic populism
and revival are founded on a strong political rejection of non-Islamic values and
ways of life.
This paper evaluates these contending views through a survey-based
research design that compares popular support of Islamist to non-Islamist
militant groups in the Middle East. Characteristics of the supporters of the
militant Islamist Hezbollah in Lebanon are compared with that of the supporters
of the Lebanese Forces, a Christian militant organization developed to ‘defend
[Christians] against impending internal and external threats’.9
Lebanese Forces have positioned themselves politically on an antithetical
course to that of Hezbollah and closer to that of Western political traditions. The
left–right divide may not clearly differentiate the groups, as each provides an
opportunistic and conditional support for privatization or the expansion of
public programmes while their social orientation has often intertwined with
religious conservatism. Yet, rhetorically, both groups appear to mobilize
supporters on differential versions of nationalism. As a means to preserve and
protect the Christian presence in Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces bases its platform
on supporting a strong independent nation-state as well as the positioning of
6 While it is a term better applied to Christian revivalism, there are many definitions of ‘Islamic
revivalism’. For the purposes of this paper, however, we aim to examine the radical Islamic political
mobilizations that seek, in different forms and strategies, the eradication of the current traditional or
‘moderate’ Middle Eastern governments and the expulsion of Western influences. It is from this angle
that we look at Islamist movements without ruling out other social, cultural or religious traits.
7 Samual Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1996. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern
Response, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002. Sanford Lakoff, ‘The reality of Muslim
exceptionalism’, Journal of Democracy, 15, 2004, pp. 133–139.
8 Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 52–59.
9 See ‘The Lebanese Forces Official Website’, ,http://www.lebanese-forces.org/lfintroduction/
index.shtml . (accessed May 2009).
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Lebanon within the global context of democratic internationalism. Hezbollah, on
the other hand, conditions its own brand of nationalism to the extent with which
it stands in harmony with the Iranian brand of pan-Shi’ism, which rejects
Western-ordered secular nationalism in favour of a theocratic–sectarian order
within the nation-state, also known as Wilayat al-Fakih.10
The survey in this study focuses on aspects of sectarian political support,
national identification and other contested propositions in order to revealwhether
such variables are consistent with the theories outlined above and whether they
are exceptional to Islamists. Accordingly, the survey identified supporters of
Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces and then asked a range of opinion questions
related to the various theoretical explanations. Further analysis serves to address
the extent to which post-national, comparative institutional or class analysis can
explain political support for militant sectarian groups. To the extent that the
findings, for both the supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces, are
consistent with the theories, more confidence is gained in those explanations; to
the extent that the views of supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces are
different from one another, then the possibility of Islamic exceptionalism can be
entertained.
This paper provides some background regarding Hezbollah and the Islamist
movement in Lebanon before elaborating on the various theories that might
account for the general appeal of militant groups and Hezbollah in particular.
While alternative theories for sectarian militant movements are considered, the
key concern is whether there is evidence supporting Islamic exceptionalism.
Following that discussion, results from the public opinion survey of respondents
who identify themselves as either supporters of Hezbollah or of the Lebanese
Forces are analysed. The comparison of the two groups provides evidence as to
whether there are unique, or exceptional, characteristics of Hezbollah supporters.
The findings suggest that the exceptionalism hypothesis does not help us
distinguish between supporters of the two groups.
Lebanese Islamism
Similar to many developing countries in the MENA region and much of the
Islamic world, it has been difficult to refer to Lebanon as one state and one
people, as conflicting post-colonial ‘national paradigms’ have emerged, calling
into question the viability of a concrete national identity.11 Beyond its historical
diversity, a series of global and regional challenges has fuelled contradictory
notions of nationhood in Lebanon.12 After all, the country has been impacted
10 Salamey and Pearson, op. cit.
11 Imad Salamey and Paul Tabar, ‘Consociational democracy and urban sustainability: bridging
the confessional divides in Beirut’, Journal of Ethnopolitics, 7, 2008, pp. 239–263.
12 Imad Salamey, ‘Failing consociationalism in Lebanon& integrative options’, International Journal
of Peace Studies, 14, 2009, pp. 83–105. Early post-state national identity crises emerged in 1958 after
Sunnis took uppan-ArabNasserist sentiments against Christianswho supported a non-ArabLebanese
national identity. The impasse led to violent street confrontations between both sides. In 1975, charged
by pan-Arab national appeals, both Sunnis and Shi’itesmobilized around the Palestinian cause against
primarily theMaronites, the latterwhich opposed the growing Palestinianmilitary and political role in
the country, thus leading to a 30-year-long civil war. The 1975 civil war ended only after the Ta’ef
Accord which amended the constitution and asserted Lebanon’s Arab affiliations.
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by tumultuous ideological and regional turmoil, beginning with the decline of
pan-Arabism, the rise of radical political Islam in both Iran and Afghanistan
during the late 1970s and 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the
weakening of secular and national ideologies in much of the surrounding
region.
The Ta’ef Accord of 1989, which was brokered by various Lebanese political
factions to end the Lebanese civil war, attempted to establish a unifying position
over national identity. And with Syria’s tutelage over the country and
suppression of dissenting voices (1990–2005), the debate over national identity
had declined.13
Following the Syrian troop withdrawal, however, the debate sharply
resurged. The pullout of foreign troops from Lebanon—Israeli in 2000 and
Syrian in 2005—offered the Lebanese the opportunity to independently
re-examine and reformulate a coherent national vision. Global and regional
tensions, however, undermined the efforts to bring some unity regarding the
direction of Lebanon. In fact, the post-Syrian, post-Israeli ‘independence period’
was torpedoed by strong national polarizations leading to renewed sectarian and
political strife (2005–2009).
In general, post-9/11 global policies and the Bush Administration’s War on
Terror had established an environment conducive to ideological and sectarian
polarizations, thus further complicating the formation of a coherent Lebanese
nationalism.14 This polarization has been manifested in Islamists’ growing
opposition of states’ ‘anti-terror’ policies and is reflected in mounting suspicion
toward the very foundation of the nation-state and its geopolitical and
international commitments.15 For instance, militant Shi’ite Hezbollah has
come to consider the 2004 US-sponsored UN Resolution 1559, deemed by
the party as unfavourable to the cause of Islamic resistance against Israel, as
non-nationalistic.16 In geopolitical terms, the party considers the Islamic Re-
public of Iran’s military and financial contributions to the party’s anti-Israeli
campaigns as being an accommodating nationalist position regardless of inter-
national laws or their stipulations.17 This ethos has driven a wedge between
the party and other proponents of state sovereignty and supporters of UN
Resolution 1559.
The turbulent events of May 2007 in Northern Lebanon (at the Nahr al-Bared
Palestinian refugee camp) and in May 2008 in Beirut (after the government tried
to limit Hezbollah’s communications infrastructure) perpetuated the already
existing fear that militant Islamists, such as the Sunni Fatah al Islam and the
Shi’ite Hezbollah, not only espouse a vision of a state that is antithetical to a
13 Imad Salamey and Rhys Payne, ‘Parliamentary consociationalism in Lebanon: equal citizenry
vs. quoted confessionalism’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 14, pp. 451–473.
14 The early manifestation of Lebanese nationalism emerged following independence from France
and the declaration of a Lebanese National Covenant in 1943. Lebanon became a member of the
United Nations and the Arab League.
15 This applies to both Sunni and Shi’ite militant Islamist groups who have opposed the state’s
crackdown on perceived Islamist ‘terrorist’ organizations in Northern Lebanon in 2004 and in 2007.
16 UN Security Council Resolution 1559, passed in 2004, calls for the withdrawal of Syrian forces
from Lebanon and for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, implicating Palestinian groups as
well as Hezbollah.
17 Iran, through Syria, provides a variety of military training and assistance to Hezbollah, a matter
considered to be in violation of UN Resolution 1701, which forbids the armament of non-state actors.
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nation-state paradigm, but that they would resort to violence to secure their
vision.18
Despite efforts to undermine existing differences between the various
Lebanese sectarian factions over the country’s national destiny and the role of the
state through the Doha Agreement—which was brokered in May 2008 with the
aim to end sectarian unrest and bring the various national groups together—
divisions have only deepened with sectarian groups acting above the law or
national consensus.19
In May 2008, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah publically
declared his loyalty to Wilayat al-Fakih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists or
Supreme Jurist), underlining the perception that Hezbollah’s nationalism is
secondary to that of its commitment to an Iranian brand of Shi’ism.20 The party’s
priorities can therefore be viewed as regional and transnational, with declared
aims as to liberate Palestine, defeat colonial forces in the region, and strengthen
geopolitical, financial and military ties to Iran, Syria and Gaza.21 The party’s
defiant militant declarations challenging international political impositions have
only served to increase the party’s popularity.
Yet, this presumably militant and often religious (rather than nationalist)
characteristic of the party, and that of its supporters, may not be exceptionally
Islamist. When driven to a disadvantageous power position vis-a`-vis the state,
other religious sectarian groups at various historic periods have cast doubt onto
their national patriotism and commitment to Lebanese nationalism. For example,
the Druze Social Progressive Party, the various Sunni pan-Arab nationalist
parties and several Christian groups have each periodically taken militant, local
and often religious positions rather than nationalist stands, all while
strengthening their respective ties to foreign sponsorship.22
In fact, this sectarian proximity to state relationship was positively
demonstrated after Hezbollah began its integration into the Lebanese governance
18 Fatah al Islam, a Sunni group linked to al-Qaida, attempted inMay 2007 to violently overrun the
Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Barad Palestinian refugee camp and in the city of Tripoli in Northern
Lebanon and establish an Islamic Emirate. The group was crushed by the Lebanese Army after a long
combat that only ended in December 2007. In Southern Lebanon, parts of the Bekaa Valley and the
southern suburbs of Beirut, Hezbollah maintains semi-autonomous control with an independent
military security apparatus. After a long and escalating national dispute over its arsenal of weapons,
Hezbollah waged a decisive military insurgency in West Beirut to suppress opposing groups and
force a reverse of the Lebanese cabinet’s decision to ban the party’s private telecom network.
Hezbollah insists on the duality of power between the Lebanese State and its own functions as a
resistance against the state of Israel. This compares well with the role played out by PalestinianHamas
throughout the 1990s in the Palestinian Territories andwell into 2007when the group finally waged an
armed insurgency against the Palestinian National Authority.
19 See details of the Doha Agreement:,http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?
ID ¼ 44023/. (accessed December 2008).
20 Various theological Shi’ite interpretations exist as to the degree of commitment, through
emulation, an individual must maintain to Wilayat al-Fakih. Strict conservatives, such as Hezbollah
supporters, would elevate this commitment above any national considerations. See Hassan
Nasrallah’s victory speech commemorating eight years since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on
26 May 2010: ,http://www.sh22y.com/vb/t12769.html. (accessed April 2010).
21 See ‘An open letter: the Hizballah Program’, al-Safir, 16 February 1985. Also, Imad Salamey,
‘Eyes on Nasrallah’, New Statesman, 19 November 2007.
22 Sunni pan-Arab Nasserist groups such as Al-Mourabetoun and the Popular Nasserist Arab
Union; Christian groups such as the Cedar Defenders and the South Lebanon Army.
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process, which necessitated cross-confessional alliances. By 2009, the party’s
militant rhetoric was significantly moderated in favour of a multi-confessional
rather than an Islamist state. In his 2009 televised address, Nasrallah openly
supported Lebanese confessional consociationalism. Of course, Hezbollah’s
conception of multi-confessionalism necessitated its sectarian and regional
dominance over Shi’ite areas within Lebanon.
Such dynamics demonstrate that the course of Lebanese politics is driven by
strong sectarian and transnational momentums that have a direct impact on the
conception and fate of Lebanese nationalism.23 This ambiguous relation-
ship between Islamists, sectarian groups and the state is casting doubt on the
sustainable viability of the Lebanese State and the national paradigm—a
challenge that can be found in many MENA countries (e.g. Iraq, Yemen, Sudan,
Algeria, Palestine, Pakistan and Afghanistan). Thus, the examination of the
Lebanese case can be revealing in various comparative, social and post-
independence national experiences, particularly in countries confronting the
phenomenal rise of Islamist populism.
Competing Explanations of Islamic Revivalism in Lebanon
The belief systems of militant groups in Lebanon and, specifically, whether
supporters of Islamist Hezbollah are significantly different from those of the
Christian Lebanese Forces are examined in this paper within the framework of
competing theories of the rise of Islamic populism. Our primary interest is to
examine the Islamic exceptionalism argument. The question we ask is whether
support for Hezbollah takes a unique form or whether it appears to follow the
same pattern of support for other populist groups (as represented by the
Lebanese Forces in this paper). If the patterns are similar, then there would
appear to be nothing unique about Islamists’ support. But if the supporters of
Hezbollah do not respond in the same way to routine social, economic and
political forces as do the supporters of the Lebanese Forces, then we can at least
entertain the possibility of Islamic exceptionalism.
To elaborate, we will briefly review the Islamic exceptionalism thesis and then
follow it with a review of competing propositions that we will use to compare
adherents of the two groups.
First, the cultural exceptionalism hypothesis attributes political behaviours to
a socially determinant set of values accumulated by a particular society over a
range of historical experiences—or, in this case, inherent in its faith. Samuel
Huntington expressed one aspect of the cultural thesis in his acclaimed ‘clash of
civilization’ theory, wherein he associates Islamic societies’ unique and
exceptional characteristics with the nature of their (religious) belief system and
the corollary civilization resulting in these unique sets of political behaviours.24
Such a hypothesis asserts values in conflict (especially Christian vs. Islamic) and
the inherent clash among civilizations. The hypothetical implication of
Huntington’s view in the Lebanese case would suggest exceptional political
values that set supporters of Islamist groups apart from the Christians, among
23 Salamey and Pearson, op. cit., pp. 416–438. Salamey and Tabar, op. cit., pp. 239–263. Salamey
and Payne, op. cit., pp. 451–473.
24 Huntington, op. cit.
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others, and place them on an ultimate national collision course. This paper
examines the exceptional cultural hypothesis by comparing political support
between the militant Islamist Hezbollah and the militant Christian Lebanese
Forces—the dichotomy where the clash should be most evident. Differences in
national identification in terms of national allegiances, respective attitudes
toward other co-national sects and perceived national priorities are among other
operational variables that would provide strong indications confirming the
religion-driven exceptional views in relation to nation-state building.25
The post-nationalism perspective, specifically, argues that globalization and
the weakening of the nation-state system naturally produce a different set of
allegiances and expectations of that state in lieu of other actors.26 The state should
therefore be an auxiliary focus of attention and expectations; identity should be
less tied to the nation (as embodied by the state). Instead, it is expected that
individuals find transnational allegiances across state boundaries. This is
particularly the case when ethnic and religious groups reach out for ‘kin’ support
beyond national borders when confronted by common cultural and political
challenges, which their respective nation-states fail to effectively address. Amid
the formation of a fragmented and weak state in post-Saddam Iraq, for instance,
Iraq’s Shi’ites have forged strong political and strategic ties with their Iranian
Shi’ite compatriots in a bid to confront perceived Sunni threats. Localized
affiliations—such as sectarian, tribal, clan-based or familial—would also be
expected in reaction to the state’s failures to accommodate local cultural and
political aspirations within the national context.
Further buttressing the post-nationalism perspective, Islamic exceptionalism
would argue that the Islamic faith, in particular, inclines adherents towards
transnational and localized directions. If this survey indeed finds that only
Hezbollah supporters conform to that pattern, it would support the theory of
Islamic exceptionalism. But if supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces
both exhibit that same pattern, the post-nationalism paradigm should be held as a
more general explanation of populism and it would undermine the exceptionalist
argument. If neither group sees strong affiliations within or beyond the nation-
state, then the entire theoretical proposition is subject to question and would also
undermine the exceptionalist perspective.
The comparative institutionalist hypothesis attributes to militant Islamic
populism the presence of inadequate national institutions that have either
undermined or marginalized Islamist aspirations. As a consequence, groups’
grievances have been translated into militant political action demanding a greater
voice, to use Hirschman’s rational choice model terminology.27 Confirming such a
25 Divergent and often conflicting political aspirations drive leaders to seek the support of foreign
countries to balance against their national rivals. On the same day of 14 October 2008, the Christian
leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Gag’a, was meeting with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt for
support while at the same time his Christian opponent, Michael Aoun, was meeting with Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seeking Iranian backing. Meanwhile, President Michel Sleiman
was meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to strengthen bilateral relations between the two
governments, while the Shi’ite Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh was meeting with Syrian President
Bashar Al-Assad to establish formal diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria.
26 Axtmann, op. cit., pp. 259–279.
27 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Westview Press, Boulder,
CO, 1994.
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hypothesis in the Lebanese contextwould suggest that political support to Islamists
is driven by the perception of deficient national political institutions. Comparing
the views of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces toward the state’s institutions
would indicate varying attitudes toward the political regime and how it performs.
A comparative perception of political deprivation and unequal rights showing
greater grievances by Islamists would provide solid support for the exceptionalist
framework using this thesis. If both groups are high in their sense of deprivation,
then it would suggest that this is a general theory; if neither group is high, then
comparative institutionalism would fail as an explanation—at least in these cases.
Finally, economic and class-driven views have claimed in various degrees
that Islamist populism is a reaction to liberal and global hegemonization. Such
views hold that policies of state liberalization—particularly privatization and the
deterioration of state-sponsored social programmes—and economic deprivation
are substantially responsible for the rise of competing Islamic social networks
and, consequently, the growing capacity of Islamists to mobilize the strata of
economically deprived and marginalized social groups.28 Lebanese political
Islamization, from this perspective, implies that Islamist support is derived
predominantly from the economic underclass. A comparative analysis between
the supporters of Hezbollah and those of the Lebanese Forces should underscore
respective constituents’ social class differences. Again, if both groups are high in
this regard, then the theory appears to hold as a general explanation for populist
support; if neither group is high, the theory is undermined.
Survey at Lebanese American University
In order to examine these various propositions, a comparative group research
design was established in order to compare supporters of the Islamist Hezbollah
with those of the militant pro-Western Christian group, the Lebanese Forces. This
research design allows the examination of the peculiar characteristics, if any, of
Islamist support. For that purpose, a Lebanese American University (LAU)
survey was conducted with supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces
(n ¼ 180) in 2008.
The survey’s systematic random sample was drawn from the 2008 official
Lebanese landline household phone directory. The phone directory contained over
1 million phone numbers (landlines). One advantage associated with surveying by
telephone is the potential to collect a large amount of data within a short period of
time, thus limiting the effects of time-laden spurious variables. It also provides
greater confidentiality and privacy for respondents. More so than in most Western
societies,where response rates to telephone surveys averagewell below10per cent,
telephone surveys in Lebanon have proven much more effective, with response
rates to medium-length surveys averaging as high as 60–70 per cent. The sample
was stratified in order to closely reflect the regional demographic distribution as
established by statistics from theNational Survey ofHousehold Living Conditions,
which was undertaken by the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs in 2004.
The survey was carried out by students from the Political Science and
International Affairs Program at LAU who received comprehensive training in
phone interviewing. Training techniques instructed interviewers on ways and
28 Salamey and Pearson, op. cit., pp. 416–438.
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means to take into consideration sectarian, religious and political sensitivities of
the participants.29 All interviews were conducted in Arabic via telephone. The
survey took about 18–20 minutes to complete and asked a variety of questions
designed to test the competing explanations. A screening question was used to
determine support for either Hezbollah or the Lebanese Forces. The sample size
of the phone survey is 180 and responses to questions vary within the 170s.
Statistical significance tests were used in all analyses which, of course, take into
account the sample size. Proportion estimates for a sample size of 175 at 95 per
cent confidence are ^0.07. The results reported are not intended to be
representative of the Lebanese population, but rather representative of
supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces.
For the post-nationalist, comparative institutionalist and class-based analysis,
there are three possible outcomes when comparing supporters of Hezbollah with
those of the Lebanese Forces. First, both Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces
supporters could provide responses consistent with each theory. If that pattern is
found, then that theory is generally (rather than exceptionally) supported. But if
neither group provides responses consistent with a particular theory, then the
theory is generally undermined. Or, it could be the case that only supporters of
Hezbollah provide responses consistent with the various explanations, which
would suggest that there is some merit to the exceptionalism argument and that
the theory may be an explanation for how that exceptionalism plays out in
practice.30 A number of questions designed to tap the exceptionalism argument
directly are also asked.
The post-nationalism theory is explored using questions that indicate the
respondent’s views of the state and bases of identity. Specifically, to gain an
understanding of how the respondent views the role of the state, the survey asks
what the priorities of the state should be. For identity, the survey asks how the
respondents express themselves in terms of identity and what they would be
willing to defend the most.
To assess the comparative institutionalism explanation, the survey asks
questions that are evaluative of the performance of the state. It also asks
questions about the quality of representation respondents feel they receive from
their elected officials and whether they feel they receive equal treatment from the
state.
To suggest class-based differences, the survey looks at demographics,
particularly within the vectors of income and education; the survey also poses
some general questions assessing respondents’ views of the economic conditions
within Lebanon.
Finally, to assess directly the exceptionalism argument, the survey asks
respondents about the importance of religion, their views of their neighbour-
hoods and questions regarding modernity.31
29 The survey instrument was designed by various specialists. The survey was reviewed and
approved by LAU’s Committee on Human Subjects in Research.
30 There is, of course, a fourth possibility, and that is that the theories are found consistent with the
views of only supporters of the Lebanese Forces, but that would go beyond the theoretical interest of
this paper and was not found in our data analysis.
31 Several questions were asked to gauge for attitude toward modernity such as: ‘Was life better
before computer, internet, and imported life styles?’ ‘With the new life styles, do you fear for the
future generation?’
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One theme developed throughout the data analysis and findings is that the
views of supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces are generally similar,
and where they do diverge it is generally over questions of tactics and political
strategy.
Data Analysis
Post-nationalism
The analysis of the post-nationalism explanation for Islamist support began with
the fundamental question of identity by asking the respondents how they
identify themselves. Needless to say, and as expected, differences between the
Shi’ite Hezbollah respondents and the Christian Lebanese Forcers respondents
are evident throughout. Still, Table 1 shows that both groups are significantly
more likely to self-identify simply as ‘Lebanese’ more than anything else. And in
both cases, they were also more likely to say Lebanese-Muslim or Lebanese-
Christian than just Muslim or Christian. Only 13 per cent of Hezbollah
supporters did label themselves as Arabic-Muslim, but the strongest conclusion
from this table is that both groups exhibit substantially strong national
identification. This finding is inconsistent with both the post-nationalism and
Islamic exceptionalism arguments, with the possible exception of a fraction of
Hezbollah supporters.
Taking identity a step further, the survey asked what the respondents would
be most willing to defend. Overwhelmingly, both groups responded by placing
the family/clan first, followed by the nation (Table 2). Generally, responses do
not seem consistent with the post-nationalism explanation either. About 21 per
cent of Hezbollah supporters place their sect or religion as the first to defend, but
that was still just less than half the number of those who placed the nation first,
compared to about two and half times the number of Lebanese Forces supporters
who provided that response.
The post-nationalism argument suggests that the traditional role of the nation-
state should be less important than other priorities. Consistent with post-
nationalism would be elevating priorities such as preserving community values or
improving human rights. Matters of security, national unity and economic
growth—traditional state functions—might rank as less important. However,
consistent with the findings of Hutson’s survey of south Lebanese communities,
this survey finds no prevalence of communalism over state loyalty as the post-
nationalism argument suggests.32 Both Hezbollah and Lebanese Forces supporters
showed strong adherence to Lebanese nationalism and the state, prioritizing
domestic security, national unity and fostering economic growth.33 The responses
for both groups are strikingly consistent, with the only notable difference being a
32 Strong support to state-sponsored security institutions were found among Hezbollah
supporters by a survey-based study in Southern Lebanon. See Royce Hutson, Athena Kolbe, Ted
Haines, Bernadette Stringer, Harry Shannon and Imad Salamey, ‘Testing received wisdom:
perceptions of security in Southern Lebanon’, in Small Arms Survey (eds), Small Arms Survey 2009:
Shadows of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
33 For spatial constraints, this table and a number of subsequent tables are not shown, but are
available from the authors upon request.
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slightly lesser emphasis on domestic security and greater emphasis on national
unity by Hezbollah supporters. Again, these findings provide little support for
either the post-nationalist explanation or Islamic exceptionalism.
The survey also asked whether sectarian diversity is a source of strength or a
weakness for Lebanon. The exceptionalism hypothesis, especially in the form
that suggests a clash of civilizations, would predict the Hezbollah supporters as
dissatisfied with living in such a diverse environment. Further, the post-
nationalism hypothesis would suggest that a diverse state might lead to
dissatisfaction that would breed extremist groups of all types. Both hypotheses
are dramatically wrong (Table 3). Approximately two-thirds of each sectarian
group find diversity in Lebanon to be a source of strength.
Due to the protracted crisis in nation building throughout post-indepen-
dence, the debate over state and nation building are often intertwined. The post-
nationalism analysis provides little evidence of its value as an explanation for the
Table 1. Which of the following best represents your identity?
Supporters of:
Hezbollah (%)
Lebanese
Forces (%) Total (%)
Which of the following
best represents your
identity?
Muslim—Shi’ite, Sunni,
Druz
14.1 2.6 9.1
Christian—Maronite,
Orthodox, Catholic,
Protestant
3.0 5.2 4.0
Lebanese-Muslim 16.2 5.2 11.4
Lebanese-Christian 3.0 31.2 15.3
Arab-Muslim 13.1 1.3 8.0
Lebanese 41.4 51.9 46.0
Arab 9.1 2.6 6.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 176, p , 0.001.
Table 2. Which of the following are you most willing to defend?
Supporters of:
Hezbollah (%)
Lebanese
Forces (%) Total (%)
Which of the following
are you most willing
to defend?
Family/clan 42.6 52.1 46.6
Sect 4.0 1.4 2.9
Social class 1.0 0.6
Nation 31.7 39.7 35.1
Pan-Arab nationalism 4.0 1.4 2.9
Religion 16.8 5.5 12.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 174, not significant.
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militancy of Hezbollah or the Lebanese Forces. There is no evidence of the
rejection of the state or of the desirability to engage in nation building. Diversity
is valued. Respondents generally identify themselves as Lebanese in some form
and there is a reasonable willingness to defend the nation. Nor is there support,
to this point, of the exceptionalism argument. Except for the obvious differences
that occur naturally in political debates and electoral campaigns to mobilize
adherents, there is little that differentiates the principal views of Hezbollah
supporters from those of the Lebanese Forces.
Comparative Institutionalism
The comparative institutionalism argument claims that groups who feel that state
institutions work to their disadvantage, by undermining or marginalizing their
powerposition, are likely to becomemoremilitant.34Accordingly, it is expected that
Islamist supporters would express negative evaluations of the state apparatus and
to feel disadvantaged. Table 4 supports that exception, presenting clear evidence
that both groups evaluate the performance of the state poorly. Over three-fourths of
each group say the provision of public services is not sufficient. And when asked
about the overall performance of the political system, about half say it is not
working (althoughmost believe it is salvageable). The responses, however, indicate
that there is generallymore optimism thanpessimismabout the future, but there are
many who expect conditions to worsen. While not statistically significant, there is
more pessimism among Lebanese Forces supporters than among the Hezbollah.
So, do these negative evaluations also lead the respondents to think that the
system works to their disadvantage? Few affirm that their rights and liberties as
citizens are well preserved. In fact, about half to two-thirds think they are hardly
preserved or not preserved at all, but the differences between Hezbollah
supporters and Lebanese Forces supporters are not statistically significant.
Moreover, when asked whether they do worse than other citizens in Lebanon,
large numbers of both groups say they are treated at least somewhat unequally.
Even more challenging is that about two-thirds of each group thinks they are
excluded from rights and services provided to members of other sects (Table 5).
The survey also asked about the quality of representation respondents feel
they receive from their Members of Parliament and from their municipal
councillors. Neither set of elected officials consistently receive highmarks. In fact,
Table 3. Do you think that sectarian diversity in Lebanon is . . . ?
Supporters of:
Hezbollah (%)
Lebanese
Forces (%) Total (%)
Do you think that sectarian
diversity in Lebanon
is:
A source of strength? 68.0 65.8 67.1
Asourceofweakness? 32.0 34.2 32.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 170, not significant.
34 Gurr and Harff, op. cit.
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about half respond that their MPs hardly or don’t represent them at all. Local
officials fare a little better and supporters of the Lebanese Forces are more
positive about them, but there is clearly substantial dissatisfaction among both
groups of partisans for both sets of elected officials.
Overall, the comparative institutionalist hypotheses fare quite well. There is a
strong sentiment among supporters of both militant groups that the state is
failing its citizens and that there are biases in the political process. The
circumstances surrounding Lebanese state building and the resultant challenges
facing the state should make these findings not surprising. But whether expected
or not, this theoretical framework suggests these are exactly the circumstances
that can lead to extremist forms of political action.
At the same time, these findings do nothing to suggest that supporters of
Hezbollah see Lebanese institutions in a worse light than do those of the
Lebanese Forces. There is no evidence that suggests that there is something
uniquely Islamic about the way Lebanese institutions are evaluated and the
resultant political extremism.
Class Analysis
Class analysis suggests that militancy can be attributed to economic conditions as
an economic underclass seeks a more advantageous outcome. Table 6 provides an
Table 4. How do you feel about public services in Lebanon today?
Supporters of:
Hezbollah (%)
Lebanese
Forces (%) Total (%)
How do you feel about public
services in Lebanon today? By
public services, I mean the
provision of things like water,
electricity, transportation,
health and education. How do
you feel about them?
Excellent 2.6 1.3
Acceptable 20.5 21.1 20.8
Not sufficient 76.9 78.9 77.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 77, not significant.
Table 5. Are you excluded from rights and services provided to other sects?
Supporters of:
Hezbollah (%) Lebanese Forces (%) Total (%)
Are you excluded from rights and
services provided to other sects?
Yes 65.7 68.8 67.0
No 34.3 31.2 33.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 176, not significant.
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estimate for whether there are grounds for an economic explanation. Almost three-
fourths of the respondents report a monthly income of less than $1000.35
Additionally, the incomeofHezbollahpartisans is substantially lower.About 85per
cent ofHezbollah supporters have incomes of less than $1000 amonth compared to
about 59 per cent of the supporters of the Lebanese Forces. In fact, Hezbollah
supporters are almost twice as likely to have incomes of less than $500 per month.
Perhaps making the income finding all the more telling is that the education
levels between the two groups is not significantly different (Table 7). Hezbollah
supporters are twice as likely to have an elementary education or less, but the
numbers are small—about 6 per cent. The combined income and education
picture presents a context that would lend some credence to class-based
explanations. It is also worth mentioning that the measure of income is personal
income and the findings point to distinct gender differences in the two groups.
Sixty per cent of the surveyed respondents of Hezbollah supporters are female, as
opposed to only 40 per cent for the supporters of the Lebanese Forces.
Additional analysis does not present a picture that draws a sharp distinction
between the two groups. When asked about job opportunities in the country, no
one says they are excellent, but Hezbollah supporters are slightly less likely to see
them as fair and slightly more likely to see them as poor. These differences,
however, are not statistically significant. In addition, Hezbollah supporters were
less likely (but not significantly) to indicate that they or a family member has
migrated for job purposes.
Because of the low income levels of the supporters of both groups, there is
some evidence to suggest that the economic situation plays a role in attracting
adherents to militant groups. The survey does not have enough evidence to
conclude how far class-based analyses would go in terms of explanatory power,
but it would be a mistake to dismiss them without more substantial analysis.
Table 6. Monthly income in US$
Supporters of:
Hezbollah
(%)
Lebanese Forces
(%)
Total
(%)
Monthly income in US$: Below $500 41.9 22.2 32.8
$500–$1000 43.2 36.5 40.1
$1000–$1500 9.5 15.9 12.4
$1500–$2000 2.7 7.9 5.1
$2000–$2500 1.4 7.9 4.4
$3000–$3500 3.2 1.5
$3500–$4000 1.4 3.2 2.2
Above $4000 3.2 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 137, p ¼ 0.03.
35 The CIA World Factbook estimates Lebanon’s per capita GDP at $13,100 (2009 est.). See the
Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, 2010,
,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html/. (accessed April
2010).
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Exceptionalism
This section directly examines the question of whether Islamic exceptionalism
carries substantial explanatory power when comparing supporters of Hezbollah
and the Lebanese Forces. The exceptionalism theory suggests that Islam is more
than a religion—that it is a way of life.36 If that is the case, it would be expected to
find Hezbollah supporters to be very religious, or at least presumably more so
than the supporters of the Lebanese Forces. Table 8 shows that neither
presumption is the case. Only 3.9 per cent of Hezbollah supporters claim to be
very religious compared to 10.4 per cent of supporters of the Lebanese Forces.
Hezbollah supporters are also less likely to call themselves religious (17.5 per
cent compared to 19.5 per cent). In fact, about two-thirds of Hezbollah supporters
say they are moderately religious and about 10 per cent say ‘not very’ or ‘not at
all’ religious. The degree of religiosity between the two groups is not statistically
significant.
The exceptionalism hypothesis also suggests that Islamists should be less
comfortable interacting with other sectarian groups. If they feel a ‘clash of
civilizations’, they are likely to want to be isolated from other sectarian groups.
However, Hezbollah supporters are more comfortable in mixed neighbourhoods
than are those who support the Lebanese Forces. Only about a quarter of
Hezbollah supporters (vs. 37 per cent for Lebanese Forces) feel safer in a
neighbourhood populated dominantly by their own sect.
Additionally, the survey asked a series of three questions designed to
tap respondents’ views regarding modernity. For both groups, it was generally
found that there is concern about modernity, what it brings and how it will affect
future generations. In this regard, the survey found no significant differences
between the two groups. The closest significant difference found that Hezbollah
supporters tend towards both extremes when it comes to fearing for the future
generation.
Table 7. Highest education level completed
Supporters of:
Hezbollah (%)
Lebanese
Forces (%) Total (%)
Highest education
level completed:
None 2.0 1.1
Elementary 4.0 2.6 3.4
Middle school 11.9 11.8 11.9
High school 22.8 25.0 23.7
Pre-college or technical
degrees
7.9 11.8 9.6
College—BA, BS 41.6 34.2 38.4
Master—MA, MBA, MS 7.9 10.5 9.0
Professional—MD, JD, PhD 2.0 3.9 2.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 177, not significant.
36 Lakoff, op. cit., pp. 133–139.
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The results of this part of the analysis reinforce the previous findings
throughout the analysis: that there is little to suggest that there is anything
exceptional about the supporters of Hezbollah when compared to the supporters
of the Lebanese Forces.
Strategic and political considerations
Having reached the conclusion that the exceptionalism hypothesis is not well
supported by the survey analysis, it should not be concluded that there are no
differences between the supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces. The
survey found differences on a wide range of political and strategic decisions. This
section summarizes some of them.
When asked what type of political system would be best for Lebanon, for
example, markedly different results were found. Nearly all Lebanese Forces
supporters indicate that they either want a system like the USA or a social
democratic system. Hezbollah supporters also frequently favour social democracy,
but few want to model Lebanon after the USA and more want a confessional
system. It is worth noting that very few supporters of either group want a system
governed by religious guidance. The lack of Hezbollah support of such a system is
further evidence contrary to the exceptionalist argument.
Differences between the two groups arise when asked about specific reforms.
Hezbollah partisans most desire a proportional system, while supporters of the
Lebanese Forces favour small majoritarian districts. Regarding economic
reforms, supporters of Hezbollah are more likely to want to strengthen the
public sector and control economic liberalization while Lebanese Forces seek
both foreign and domestic investment. When asked about an overall political
strategy, supporters of the Lebanese Forces are more likely to want neutrality
while Hezbollah partisans are more likely to provide nationalistic responses and
responses that identify their enemies. Strong pluralities of both groups, though,
support a national dialogue. A similar pattern is found when asked about
defence strategies with a plurality of Hezbollah supporters responding that they
support resistance movements.
Finally, respondents greatly differ in terms of their preferences for foreign
sponsorship. When asked what country can best help Lebanon achieve its
Table 8. How religious are you?
Supporters of:
Hezbollah
(%)
Lebanese Forces
(%)
Total
(%)
How religious are you? Very religious 3.9 10.4 6.7
Religious 17.5 19.5 18.3
Moderately religious 68.0 51.9 61.1
Not very religious 4.9 13.0 8.3
Not at all religious 5.8 5.2 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N ¼ 180, p , 0.10.
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national priorities, Hezbollah supporters overwhelmingly responded in favour
of Qatar and Iran. Supporters of the Lebanese Forces, meanwhile, indicated their
support for Saudi Arabia, France, the Vatican and the USA. When asked who
they feel closer to politically, Hezbollah supporters frequently responded in
favour of Syria and Iran, while supporters of the Lebanese Forces responded in
favour of the USA, France and Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, the differences
between the two camps are also great when participants were asked with whom
they feel closest to religiously. Over one-third of Hezbollah supporters say Iran
and frequently mention Palestine and Saudi Arabia. Two-thirds of Lebanese
Forces partisans say the Vatican but supporters also frequently mention France
and Saudi Arabia.
The overarching point is that both supporters of Hezbollah and the Lebanese
Forces naturally have divergent political views. They view Lebanon’s place in the
world and in the region quite differently. They also subscribe to different means
and goals by which to achieve their objectives. The differences, politically, are
very significant. But these differences are in sharp contrast to the many
similarities regarding possible explanations for their militancy.
Conclusion
This paper explored the four mainstream explanations for political militant
support against the backdrop of the opinions of supporters of Hezbollah and the
Lebanese Forces. It examined post-nationalism, comparative institutionalism
and class-based paradigms. Throughout much of the survey analysis, however,
particular attention was paid to the theory of Islamic exceptionalism.
Despite relative class-based analysis of support for militant groups showing
economic deprivation at play, the findings do not show decisive evidence of a
difference between the two sets of respondents. However, the survey did find
that a majority of Hezbollah supporters are of lower socio-economic status than
their Christian counterparts. Still neo-Marxian explanations based on economic
deprivation seem not to be a sufficient explanation for differential militant
mobilizations; both Hezbollah and Lebanese Forces supporters are charged with
a sense of injustice, inequality and marginalization.
Overall, supporters of both groups express great dissatisfaction with the
general economic and political conditions in the country. They recognize state
political institutions as failing to provide for effective and fair representation.
Explanations built upon economic circumstances coupled with state institutions
that fail the citizenry seem to hold the most promise for future research on
militants’ support.
The Islamic exceptionalist theory, however, receives no support in the survey
analysis. Except for the obvious political differences, there is little to distinguish
supporters of Hezbollah from the Lebanese Forces. Hezbollah supporters were
not found to be on an inevitable collision course with Western values. They held
positive attitudes toward inter-sectarian mixing and, contrary to Huntington’s
thesis, identified more with their nationalism as opposed to religious affiliation.
On the other hand, supporters of the Lebanese Forces were found to be more
religiously oriented. Such discourse is underscored by Hezbollah’s anti-colonial
and anti-Zionist rhetoric, providing the party with cross-confessional support
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from Sunnis as well as Christians. Pan-Arabists as well as an amalgam of leftists
have also turned their support to the party in promise of national resistance and
liberation.37 Thus, there is no basis to suggest that the clash of civilizations is the
driving vehicle for political support and mobilization of Islamists; nor is there
sufficient evidence to indicate that religious perceptions have undermined
national appeals. Theories grounded in the failures of the state and its fruitless
economic conditions, rather than theories grounded in Islamic exceptionalism,
hold much more explanatory promise for the appeal of militant Islamic groups in
Lebanon and, perhaps, the region as a whole.
Alternative to the exceptionalism thesis, Islamist mobilization in the Middle
East can perhaps be explained from the perspective of populism. The theory
stresses that the emergence of such movements, Islamist or otherwise, often arise
from the mobilization of under-represented lower classes triggered by the
repression of authoritarian governments or following political breakdowns.38
The ‘people’ going against the existing power structure is central to populists.39
The struggle against a perceived ‘elite’ responsible for political exclusion
represents the major outcry of the movement.40 A charismatic populist leader is
central to the unity and demagogical support of followers. Sectarian communal
mobilization, Christian and Islamic, serves populist appeal in closing rank
among followers and rendering internal dissent or opposition treacherous and,
other times, as defying God (Takfeer).
The survey results of this study concur with the various populist themes that
characterize support to both the Islamic Hezbollah and the Christian Lebanese
Forces. And if indeed Islamists in the Middle East are true populists rather than
exceptionally fundamentalists, then the challenge of Middle Eastern democracy
and transformation can be revealed in political rather than religious or cultural
reforms. Such prospects may need to be critically centred on the ability of state
national institutions to be accommodating. Devising inclusionary political
strategies for various social strata of society remains the essence of state building
and for the containment of populist tendencies.
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37 See public opinion survey by the Lebanese English daily the Daily Star on 26 July 2006 that
found cross-sectarian support for Hezbollah’s anti-Israeli activities,,http://www.beirutcenter.info/
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38 Francisco Panizza, ‘Introduction: populism and the mirror of democracy’, in Francisco Panizza
(ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, Verso, London, 2005, pp. 1–31. Kenneth Roberts, Populism
and Democracy in Latin America, 2000, ,http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/Rob
erts.pdf . (accessed 31 March 2010).
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Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, Verso, London, 2005, pp. 72–98. Margaret Canovan, ‘Trust the
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40 Arditi, op. cit.
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